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: Proposal for a Task Force on Sino-Soviet Relations

For some time many of us within the Agency have become increasingly concerned over the crucial need for greater attention to the problem of Sino-Soviet relations within the US Government, and even within CIA.

Few would disagree that the Moscow-Peiping alliance constitutes a grave threat to the security of this country and of the Free World. At the same time, there may be frictions and tensions within this alliance which are vulnerable to various forms of attack. However, the nature of these vulnerabilities and the means best suited for exploiting them are far from being sufficiently understood to justify launching a major carpaign.

While a full pay-off from such a campaign might be a longer term matter, both the importance of the field, and its operational potential for this Agency, dictate that we lay the broad groundwork now. True, there has been growing interest in the establishment of an interdisciplinary field of Sino-Soviet studies, both within and outside the Government. The recent international Conference on

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Soviet-Asian Relations (Los Angeles, 8-10 June 1959) produced a consensus that this field must be made into a living discipline. The larger foundations are exploring ways and means to strengthen Sino-Soviet studies in universities and research institutes. Within State's intelligence component an important step has been taken through the amalgamation of the separate Chinese Communist and Soviet Bloc Divisions into a single Office. Another conference of Soviet and Asiatic specialists is to be held in Tokyo in 1960, which this Agency and Klaus Mehnert's Ost-Europa Gesellachaft are helping to promote.

It is hard to escape the conclusion, thowever, that neither the Government now this Agency has yet come fully to grips with this crucial problem. A study of Sino-Soviet frictions initiated by the PP Staff has enlisted the support of at least eight units of DDI and DDP, and has afforded smodel of inter-office cooperations which could profitably be extended. But a full Agency effort in this field can only be achieved if given the necessary push.

A first step would be to have a small but highly qualified tak force, chaired by a senior officer of the Agency, look at the whole problem of Sino-Soviet relations, including research required, operational possibilities, and organizational needs. There exists at least one precedent for a comprehensive review of this type -

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project WSGossard, which in 195 examined the entire field of OPC operations. The approach and findings of this project could be a model for the activity of the proposed Sino-Soviet Task Force.

Hence, the undersigned strongly recommend that you create such a Task Force to look urgently into the Sino-Soviet problem, with the mission of determining whether indeed this field has truly major operational possibilities and if so, recommending what this Agency should do.

